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Summary: This article examines where intellectuals 
in Japan stood on the question of responsibility 
for the colonial past at the turn of the millennium 
through analyzing arguments generated by the 1997 
symposium, "'Nationalism and the 'Comfort Women' 
Issue." The debate, which took place in a form of 
interethnic dialogue, focused on the question of 
national subject formation. The issue of Japanese 
historical responsibility, which drew a great deal 
of media and public attention in the 1990s, has yet 
to be resolved, and is at the heart of anti-Japanese 
sentiments currently escalating over territorial 
disputes. It is central to Japan's relations with its Asian 
neighbors in the twenty-first century. The debate 
on the issue I analyze here is important because the 
participants are influential public intellectuals who are 
shaping the thought and politics of Japanese society. 
Suh Kyung-Sik, a resident Korean thinker, asserted 
that people should take responsibility as Japanese 
so long as they had enjoyed Japanese privilege in 
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postcolonial Japan. He criticized Ueno ~hizuko 
and Hanazaki KOhei, scholars of feminism and 
multiculturalism respectively, for evading "Japanese" 
responsibility on the ground that accepting such 
responsibility effectively promoted national identity 
as Japanese. Elaborating on Sub's arguments, Oka 
Mari, a specialist in Middle East literature and Third-
World feminism, and Nakano Toshio, a specialist in 
intellectual history, illuminated the problematic nature 
of subject formation among Japanese liberals who 
approach the issue of responsibility from a universal 
perspective. Takahashi Tetsuya, a philosopher known 
for his critical work on the Yasukuni Shrine, argued 
that people should take both universal responsibility 
as human beings and particular responsibility as 
Japanese 
Introduction 
Japan witnessed many social changes in the 
1990s. One of the important developments in 
this period was the emergence of the issue of war 
responsibility in public consciousness, reflecting 
the social climate characterized by the end of the 
Cold War and the 1989 death of the Showa emperor, 
among other things. War responsibility had been 
discussed by scholars and public commentators from 
time to time, but the controversy over this issue in the 
1990s significantly differed from previous debates. It 
drew a great deal of media and public attention, and 
more importantly, it included arguments on Japan's 
responsibility for colonial domination in Asia. Voices 
raised by former "military comfort women .. and other 
victims of Japanese imperialism played a central role 
in pushing Japan to confront this past. 
As has been pointed out, most Japanese had 
been oblivious to colonial responsibility largely 
due to discourse formation during the Occupation 
period. Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko's call 
for collective repentance in August 1945 rendered 
the responsible parties ambiguous and in effect held 
nobody responsible. At the same time, he addressed 
only the responsibility for Japan's defeat, not for the 
violence Japan inflicted upon other Asian countries. 
The "Pacific War" discourse was soon created through 
the cooperation of the Occupation Forces led by the 
United States and conservative Japanese leaders, 
obscuring the period preceding the war when Japan 
was committing aggression against other Asian 
countries. Under the Occupation Forces, Japanese 
people saw themselves not only as victims of the 
state but also as a colonized people. The absence 
of an adequate contingent of Asian representatives 
at the Tokyo war crimes tribunal reinforced the 
emerging tendency to ignore what Japan did in 
Asia. This tendency was maintained in the Cold 
War regime. Some efforts were made to maintain 
war memory. Yet, while the media never failed to 
address the remembering of Japanese war victims on 
the anniversary of Japan's defeat in the war, it rarely 
dealt with the issue of Asian victims even on such an 
occasion.1 The field of scholarship was not free from 
the tendency. As Yoon Keun-Cha, a resident Korean 
scholar, has pointed out in his· Influential books, 
Japanese scholars lacked an "Asian perspective" and 
1 Kiyoteru Tsutsui, '"The Trajectory of Perpetrators' Tmuma: Mnemonic Politics around the Asia-Pacific War in Japan,w Social Forces 87:3 (2009): 
1389-1422. 
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did not study the issue of decolonization seriously.2 
This began to change in the course of the 
1980s, when the issue of war responsibility gained 
importance internationally and the Chinese and 
Korean governments harshly criticized the Japanese 
government for sanitizing descriptions in history 
textbooks of Japanese aggressions in Asia. The radical 
social changes at the end of the decade facilitated 
the rise of public and intellectual interest in the issue 
of responsibility. In the 1990s, demands for official 
apology and compensation by those victimized by the 
Japanese empire prompted progressives to look into 
the past and led some politicians to make apologies. 
However, there also emerged a conservative 
nationalistic move to deny their testimonies. In turn, 
a "debate on historical consciousness" developed 
between those refusing to admit Japan's past 
wrongdoings and those criticizing such a refusal. The 
debate was intensified by the rise of an ultra-right 
position that denounced the critical view of Japanese 
imperialism as masochistic and promoted the adoption 
of a "new history textbook" free of negative appraisals 
of the past. 
The debate was further complicated by the 1995 
publication of an essay "Haisengo-ron" (Since Defeat) 
by Kato Norihiro, a literary critic. He argued for 
taking responsibility, but he called for establishing a 
unified Japanese national subject before apologizing 
to victims in other Asian countries. His argument 
attracted a great deal of attention. While appreciated 
by many, it was harshly criticized by progressive 
intellectuals, most notably by Takahashi Tetsuya, a 
philosopher publicly known for his critical work on 
the Yasukuni Shrine. The dispute between the two 
developed into a "debate on the historical subject" 
(rekishi shutai rons6).3 As J. Victor Koschmann notes, 
starting with the Meiji era, many Japanese thinkers, 
both on the political right and left, had tackled 
the issue of subject formation.4 There had been a 
tendency in the discourse of subject formation to 
ignore the colonial past and Asian Others, i.e., non-
Japanese Asians victimized by Japanese imperialism. 
Given the public testimonies of former "comfort 
women," the debate on the historical subject could 
no longer avoid addressing the question of Asian 
Others. KatO, however, hardly dealt with this 
question. Lee Hyo-Duk, a resident Korean scholar, 
characterizes Kato's argument as concerning the 
"war responsibility of 'Nihonjin' for 'Nihonjin' by 
'Nihonjin."' It was addressed to Japanese audiences 
and advocated taking responsibility solely for the 
purpose of recovering Japanese pride. Lee thus calls 
it a "masturbatory monologue."5 Witnessing the 
popularity of Kato's inward-looking view, progressive 
Japanese intellectuals felt an urgent need to have a 
dialogue with Asian Others. Many of them, including 
2 Yoon Keun-Cha, Kozetsu no rekishi ishild: Nihon Jrokka to Nihonjin. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990; Minzoku gensi5 no satetsu: Nihonjin no jiko-zO. 
Tokyo: lwanami shoten, 1994. 
3 See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ~unquiet Graves: Kato Norihiro and the Politics of Mourning,~ Japanese Studies, 18:1 (1998): 21-30; J. Victor 
Koschmann, ~National Subjectivity and the Uses of Atonement in the Age of Recession," in Tomiko Yoda and Harry Harootunian, eds., Japan after 
Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006, 123-41. 
4 Koschmann, ~National subjectivity,~ 126-27. 
5 Lee Hyo-Duk, ~'Yoriyoi Nihonjin' toiu keisho o koete,n in Komori Yoichi and Takahashi Tetsuya, eds., Nashonaru hisutorii o koete. Tokyo 
University Press, 1998, 112-13. For names, I follow the spelling each author uses in their publications, All translations are by the author. 
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Takahashi, understood responsibility primarily as the 
''responsibility to respond" (6t6 sekinin) to the Other. 
In 1997, a symposium, entitled "Nationalism 
and the 'Comfort Women' Issue," was held by the 
Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's 
War Responsibility (JWRC). The JWRC invited Suh 
Kyung-Sik, an influential resident Korean activist-
intellectual, and created the possibility of opening up 
a long-overdue dialogue about Japan's colonial past 
between the colonized and colonizers. The symposium 
drew a great deal of attention from progressives, and 
the 1998 book of .participants' discussions and essays 
promoted a number of intellectual exchanges. In what 
follows, I will examine how Japanese intellectuals 
and Sub tackled the question of "taking responsibility 
as Japanese," analyzing arguments about this question 
presented in books and essays published between 
1998 and 20026 
With Sub's participation, the symposium debate 
on colonial responsibility became a site of interethnic 
interaction where·the practice of Japanese subject 
formation was fotegrounded. Critical of nationalistic 
Japanese who denied responsibility, participants 
sought to avoid ·promoting nationalism in their 
arguments for taking responsibility. Suh, however, 
asserted that people should take responsibility as 
Nihonjin regardle'ss of their other identifications, so 
long as they had enjoyed Japanese privilege in the 
economically suceessful society built upon Japan's 
colonial domination. Using the idea of privilege, he 
criticized those who argued for transcending national 
identification as in effect evading responsibility as 
Japanese. In holding the symposium, JWRC's director 
Arai Shinichi wanted to problematize the lingering 
effects of the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, where he 
thought universal values such as peace were stressed 
while Japan's responsibility for its particular actions 
was ignored.7 Nevertheless, the appeal to universal 
values bulked large in the symposium debate. 
Further, a sense of Japan itself as a colonial victim 
of postwar U.S. dominance complicated the debate. 
A Japanese subject position attempting to transcend 
nationality by an appeal to universal values was thus 
not the only idea that was criticized during the debate. 
Japan's own victim mentality also carne under scrutiny. 
Sub's confrontational style of communication, which 
was intended to transform the colonizer-colonized 
relationship, contributed to illuminating the complex 
dynamics of the Japanese subject positions at issue. 
I want to return to the debate generated by the 
symposium held more than a decade ago because 
the problems raised in the debate have not been 
adequately addressed despite their importance in 
ongoing politics on colonial responsibility. The 
"comfort women" issue has persisted in twenty-
first century Japan and has continued to receive 
international attention. As Takahashi has admitted, 
however, public concern with Japanese responsibility 
for war and colonial domination began to dissipate at 
the beginning of the millennium8 In December 2000, 
the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on 
6 Other questions raised at the symposium include the role of oral testimonies in historiogmphy and an interrelationship between gender and ethnicity. 
7 Arai Shin'ichi, ~Maegaki,~ in JWRC, ed. Nationalism and' lanfu" Issue. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1998,3-5. 
8 Takahashi Tetsuya, "Oto no shippai, ~ Gendai shisO, 33:6 (2005): 46-54. 
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Japan's Military Sexual Slavery was held in Tokyo, 
but the media failed to publicize its significance. The 
confirmation of the abduction of Japanese by North 
Korea's operatives in September 2002 generated 
a nationwide hysterical reaction and led many 
Japanese to embrace the idea that Japan's colonial 
responsibility should be offset by the suffering of the 
Japanese abductees, their families, and by extension, 
the Japanese people. As the Japanese social climate 
was pushed toward the right, the Citizens' Group 
against Special Rights for Korean Residents in Japan 
(Zaitokukal) was formed in 2007 to denounce resident 
Koreans, not Japanese nationals, as having special 
privileges.9 In response to South Koreans' persistent 
demand for official apologies and compensation 
to former "comfort women," many Japanese have 
criticized South Korean ethno-nationalism from a 
human-rights or transnational-feminist perspective. 
The idea of taking an Asian perspective or that of 
taking responsibility as Japanese explored at the 
symposium has dissipated. 
In the academic sphere, the tendency to see the 
Japanese as the colonized has persisted. In his well 
known book, Komori YOichi uses the expression 
"self colonization" (jiko shokuminchika) to describe 
Meiji Japan's desire to master European civilization.10 
Appreciating Komori's perspective, Nishikawa 
Nagao, a leading scholar of the nation state, discusses 
colonialism based on his experience of feeling 
colonized in Japan under the U.S.-led Occupation, 
not that of living as a colonialist in Korea prior to his 
return to the homeland.11 Though critical of Japanese 
colonialism, Komori and Nishikawa allowed their 
criticism to be clouded by their view of Japan as a 
colonized country. In the mid-2000s, those embracing 
the position of transcending nationalism appreciated 
the idea of reconciliation (wakm) presented by Park 
Yu-H<,i, a South Korean scholar. In his 2010 Violence 
of Colonialism, Sub criticized this phenomenon, 
reiterating his argument in the symposium and 
pointing to the problem of unconscious nationalism 
in the assertion of transcending nationalism.12 
Meanwhile, Kang Sang-Jung, a resident Korean 
scholar rising in the Japanese mainstream media, 
has started to call for transcending nationalism, 
both among Japanese and among Koreans, going 
against Sub's effort to clarify particular historical 
responsibility. Nonetheless, as Sub acknowledges, 
some scholars have begun to tackle the issue of 
colonial responsibility with renewed interest, inspired 
by the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in 
Durban, which addressed the issue of responsibility 
for colonialism.13 There have emerged studies 
of "keizoku-suru shokuminchi-shugi" (ongoing 
colonialism) and "teikoku" (empire). The new 
scholarly efforts may benefit from revisiting the 
symposium debate, especially as regards the question 
9 Zaitokukai argues that postcolonial Koreans should be treated like other foreigners, 
1° Komori Yoichi, Posutokoroniaru, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001. 
ll Nishikawa Nagao, <Shin>Shokuminchishugi-ron: GurObarukajidai no shokuminchi-shugi o tau. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006. 
12 Suh Kyung-Sik, Shokuminchi-shugi no bOryoku. Tokyo: Kobunken, 2010, 63-68. 
13 Nagahara Yoko, ed., Colonial Responsibilities: A Comparative History ofDecolonization. Thkyo: Aoki shoten, 2009; Itagaki Ryata, "Nikkan-kaidan 
hantai-undo to shokuminchi shihai sekinin-ron," Gendai shisO, 1029 (2010): 219-238; Kim Pu-Ja and Nakano Toshio, eds, Rekishi to sekinin/' Ianfu" 
mandai to 1990-nendai. Tokyo: SeikyUsha, 2008. 
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of national subject formation in the act of taking 
responsibility. 
Transcending National Identification 
The question of taking responsibility as Japanese 
(Nihonjin toshite sekinin o toru) is complex because it 
concerns not only the issue of responsibility but also 
that of national identification. As Nishino Rumiko, a 
journalist and coordinator of the symposium, points 
out, many Japanese born in the post-war period have 
an allergic resistance to social and political pressures 
to identify as Japanese. 14 Those Japanese are not 
willing to take responsibility as Japanese, not because 
they deny the colonial past like conservatives do, 
but because they do not want to identify themselves 
as Japanese to begin with. Moreover, progressive 
scholars who have learned postmodern theories 
tend to embrace blindly the idea of transcending 
nationalism. 15 Nishikawa Nagao's 1992 How to 
Transcend National Borders was especially influential 
in spreading the idea. This tendency turns researchers 
away from looking at nationalism or national 
categorization (such as "Japanese") as an object of 
study. This amounts to an ironic use of the notion 
of nationalism, insofar as its refusal of national 
identity results in evading national responsibility or 
discouraging scholarship on this issue. The position 
of transcending nationalism was adopted by those 
critical of Kato's "Since Defeat" in their effort to stay 
away from any hint of nationalism. 
Sub addressed this problem at the symposium 
as he discussed two types of people. He calls those 
promoting a new revisionist history "dangerous 
subjects" (kikenna shutai), criticizing them for 
expressing racism. He points out how they denigrate 
Koreans involved in the "comfort women" issue as 
extremely ethno-nationalistic while at the same time 
they promote their own nationalism, itself with a 
distinct ethnic basis, as "healthy."16 The other type, 
"hollow subjects" (kiikyona shutm), are found among 
people born after Japan's defeat. Their subjective 
consciousness has been "hollowed out" and voices 
from the Other have been passing through this hollow. 
They insist that they are innocent of Japan's past 
wrongdoings, claiming that they simply happened 
to be born as Japanese but have never identified 
themselves as Japanese. Some of them show concern 
about the issue of "comfort women," but only from a 
universal perspective of deploring sexual violence. 
Sub asserts that regardless of their stance on 
national identification, those Japanese who are situated 
in the system of privilege are to be held responsible. 17 
People should take responsibility as Nihonjin so long 
as they have enjoyed the privilege of being Nihonjin 
in the economically successful society built upon 
Japan's colonial domination in Asia. This is what Suh 
means by Nihonjin. He wants Nihonjin to realize that 
they should become "responsible subjects." In his 
view, such a realization should take place individually 
(sorezore-ni), not in unison, i.e., not in a way that 
14 Nishino Rumiko, ~Shinpojiumu ga nokoshita mono,~ in JWRC, "Ianfu~ Issue, 237-247, 238. 
15 Nakarnasa, Masaki, Posuto-modan no hidari senkai. Tokyo: Jokyo shuppan, 2002, 216. 
16 Sub Kyung-Sik, ~Minzoku-sabetsu to ~kenzenna nashonarizumu" no kiken," in JWRC, ~Ianfu" Issue, 40-43. 
17 JWRC, "Paneru Disukasshon," in JWRC, "Ianfu" Issue, 59-96, 64-68. 
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would promote nationalism.18 His conceptualization of 
Nihonjin based on the notion of privilege opens up the 
possibility of taking responsibility as Nihonjin without 
essentializing this category. For Japanese privilege is 
distributed unevenly among Japanese nationals.19 
The difficulty of transcending nationalism was 
highlighted by an exchange between two keynote 
speakers at the symposium, Takahashi and Ueno 
Chizuko, a leading scholar in the field of feminism. In 
taking responsibility, Takahashi argues in his speech, 
Japanese people need to affirm their membership in 
Japan as a political community precisely because it 
is Japan's responsibility that is being interrogated 
by the Other. While saying this, he at the same time 
emphasizes that affirming one's political membership 
in the state means neither identifying with the 
state nor succumbing to nationalism.20 In the panel 
discussion, Ueno argues that his position is not very 
different from the position taken by advocates of 
civil-society discourse, especially the sociologist 
Hashizume Daizaburo, who claims that citizens 
should abide by the state's laws and that it is proper 
for them to go to war when drafted by the state. 
Takahashi counters Ueno's argument by saying that 
whereas Hashizume talks about citizens abiding by 
the law, he talks about members of the state acting 
on the state and pushing it to take responsibility. 
Though saying that she is aware of the need to take 
responsibility for what Japan has done, Ueno rejects 
the idea of taking collective responsibility based on 
the acknowledgement of membership in the state. 21 
Such an acknowledgement means identification with 
the state and hence nationalism, she argues. 22 One 
can see an ironic use of the notion of nationalism for 
avoiding collective responsibility. I will come back to 
her argument later. 
Japanese Privilege 
In his essay in the symposium book, Suh 
elaborates on the idea of privilege, using Hannah 
Arendt's "Collective Responsibility" as his theoretical 
basis. Arendt distinguishes political responsibility, 
which is collective in nature, from moral and/or legal 
guilt, which belongs to the agency of wrongdoing 
and is hence personal. She argues that by virtue of 
one's membership in a community, one has collective 
responsibility for what has been done in the name 
of the community.23 Suh claims that people born in 
post-war Japan are not guilty, but that they must take 
collective responsibility as Japanese for war and 
colonial domination.24 Arendt's following statement, 
quoted at the beginning of his essay, is especially 
relevant to his argument: 
We can escape this political and strictly collective 
responsibility only by leaving the community, 
and since no man can live without belonging to 
18 Suh Kyung-Sik, Han-nanmin no ichi kara: sengo-sekinin rons6 to zainichi Ch6senjin. Tokyo: Kage shobo, 2002, 83-87. 
19 The dispute over U.S. military bases in Okinawa and the Fukushima nuclear disasters have revealed that Japanese nationals in some regions and in 
some occupations are systematically disadvantaged. 
20 Takahashi Tetsuya, ~Sekinin towa nan-darOka,~ in JWRC, "lanfu~ Issue, 47-58, 54-57. 
21 JWRC, ~Paneru Disukasshon," 60-61,71,81. 
22 Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizumu to jenda. Tokyo: Aotosha, 1998, 185-190. 
23 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, New York: Schocken Books, 2003, 147-151. 
24 Suh, Han-nanmin, 70-71. His symposium essay is included in this book. 
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some community, this would simply mean to 
exchange one community for another and hence 
one kind of responsibility for another. It is true 
that the twentieth century has created a category 
of men who were truly outcastes, belonging 
to no internationally recognizable community 
whatever, the refugees and stateless people, who 
indeed cannot be held politically responsible for 
anything." 
Suh delineates how both state and community are 
complicated matters for him. He belongs to the group 
of Koreans who moved from colonial Korea to the 
homeland of the Japanese empire as its nationals, were 
deprived of Japanese nationality after its collapse, 
and were thereby left in post-war Japan as aliens 
with an uncertain legal status. Those who acquired 
South Korean nationality were granted permanent 
residency after the 1965 ratification of the Japan-
South Korea Treaty, but other resident Koreans, who 
advocated a unified Korea or supported North Korea, 
stayed on non-permanent resident status. In 1991, all 
postcolonial Koreans received access to permanent 
residency in Japan, but those without South Korean 
nationality remained stateless. Not equipped with full 
citizenship rights, resident Koreans have encountered 
various forms of discrimination. Given their situation, 
Sub regards them as a kind of "refugee" produced 
by Japan's colonial control and the world war. At the 
same time, those with South Korean nationality are 
nationals in the context of South Korea. Suh thus calls 
25 Arendt, Responsibility, 150. 
26 Suh, Han-nanmin, 57-62. 
27 Suh's brothers were seen as North Korean operatives. 
28 Suh,Han-nanmi, 61-65. 
himself a "a quasi-refugee" (han-nanmin). 26 
Sub speaks of responsibility from this 
perspective. Even though he has received no privilege 
from South Korea and his brothers were jailed and 
tortured by the state,27 he thinks he is responsible for 
what it has done. If interrogated by Vietnamese about 
Korean soldiers' atrocities during the Vietnam War, 
he must admit responsibility and respond to their 
interrogation. This is not because he is tied to South 
Koreans in blood and culture but because he has a 
South Korean passport. A person carrying a South 
Korean passport must not evade an inquiry from a 
Vietnamese about war responsibility by saying: "I do 
not identify as South Korean," "I am a global citizen," 
or "Many South Koreans are nice." One could be 
relieved from the responsibility of responding to such 
an inquiry only if one quit being a South Korean 
national, Sub says, invoking Arendt's argument.28 
The same can be said about Japanese 
responsibility for Japan's past, Sub thinks. Unlike 
resident Koreans, however, most Japanese take 
nationality for granted. In addition, they do not 
acknowledge the extraordinary privileges that have 
come from Japan's colonial domination. Thus, he 
makes an appeal: 
Dear Japanese nationals, please don't 
irresponsibly say: "Having been born in Japan 
by chance, I do not see myself as 'Japanese'" 
or "I am a resident Japanese" (i.e., a Japanese 
Japan's Colonial Responsibility and National Subject Formation 
who happens to live in Japan). These statements 
could be taken seriously only if you discarded 
all the rights generated by Japanese colonial 
domination and all the privileges bestowed on 
Japanese nationals, and demonstrated the spirit 
of voluntarily becoming a refugee by tearing up 
your Japanese passport. If not, the Other in Asia 
will continue to call you u. Nihorifin. "29 
Sub thus expands on Arendt's argument about political 
responsibility to include the privileges of belonging 
to a state as well as state membership itself, an 
inclusion that makes Japanese unwillingness to accept 
responsibility for Japan's colonial behavior all the 
more egregious. 
What does "passport" mean to Sub? When 
discussing his South Korean passport, Suh treats it 
in terms of civil rights and duties. In the context of 
Japan, however, he employs "passport" metaphorically 
to make it signify much more. "Passport" symbolizes 
many things Japan has done to resident Koreans: 
the deprivation of Japanese nationality after Japan's 
defeat, the instigation of intra-ethnic conflict by the 
offer to some of a South Korean passport, the creation 
of stateless people, and discrimination based on the 
lack of Japanese nationality. These problems are not 
only national but ethnic in nature because nationality 
is granted based on ethnicity in Japan. For Suh, 
"passport" also symbolizes the political, economic 
and cultural privileges Japanese nationals enjoy in 
their daily lives, privileges from which most resident 
Koreans are excluded due to their ethnicity. For him, 
a Japanese passport is an index of many aspects of 
29 Ibid., 8(}81. 
being and performing "Nihonjin." 
Indeed, "passport" does not simply signify 
national citizenship; it also implies ethnic or racial 
categorization, which is colonial in nature in the 
case of Koreans in Japan. Radhika Viyas Mongia 
notes, as regards Indians in early twentieth-century 
Canada, that in the history of the modern passport, 
one can find a history of racism and "a history of 
naturalizing the territorial boundedness of a national 
space as self-evidently the legitimate abode of certain 
people." She continues to say that the passport is "a 
document that has effectively naturalized the rule 
of colonial difference in what one might call the 
. 'rule of postcolonial difference,' where the marker of 
difference is not 'race,' but the 'universal' category of 
'nationality."'30 Given post-war Japan's treatment of 
the formerly colonized, one can say that a passport has 
naturalized colonial difference in post-w~ Japan. To 
Japanese, the Japanese passport may simply mean a 
universal category of nationality, but to many resident 
Koreans like Suh it signifies the particular history 
of colonial and postcolonial racism and Japanese 
privilege resting on such racism, which is exercised in 
the language of ethnicity. 
For Sub, ethnicity is political in the sense that 
it produces political consequences. This is where 
he differs from Takahashi. Both stress political 
responsibility and talk about the responsibility 
Japanese must fulfill as nationals through making the 
state take legal responsibility. But Suh sees political 
responsibility as responsibility people must take not 
30 Radhika Viyas Mongia, "Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport," Public Culture, 11:3 (1999): 527-555, 554-555. 
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just as Japanese nationals but also as ethnic Japanese. 
He prefers to use Nihonjin in place of "Japanese 
national" (Nihon kokumin) precisely because Nihonjin 
not only indicates Japanese nationality but also 
implies the majority Japanese ethnicity.31 Takahashi, 
on the other hand, uses Nihonjin as equivalent to 
Nihon kokumin. To clarify his distinction from 
Takahashi, Sub talks of the idea of "responsibility for 
the whole of colonial contro1."32 For him, colonialism 
is not only political and economic, but also cultural, 
and its effect is far from over. Hence he sees the 
"comfort women" issue as interwoven with the 
predicament of resident Koreans in the postcolonial 
period, during which Japan has achieved economic 
success by initially benefitting from opportunities 
provided by the Korean War. 33 
In concluding "Collective Responsibility," Arendt 
says that collective responsibility for things we have 
not done is "the price we pay for the fact that we live 
our lives not by ourselves but among our fellow men, 
and that the faculty of action, which, after all, is the 
political faculty par excellence, can be actualized 
only in one of the many and manifold forms of 
human community."34 Suh's usage of "political" is also 
inclusive of the meaning of living a life with others 
in a community. Yet, as seen above, he extends 
Arendt's argument to include in the "political" the idea 
of privilege manifested in national, ethnic, and other 
facets of life. For Sub, as for Arendt, one can escape 
political responsibility only by leaving a community, 
i.e., only by tearing up a passport. 
The Right to Identification 
The passage on passport quoted above is 
Sub's plea to Japanese nationals in general, but it 
is addressed specifically to Ueno as it immediately 
follows his criticism of her. In it, Sub is implicitly 
accusing Ueno of refusing to see the privilege she 
has by virtue of being Nihonjin regardless of her own 
personal identification. She explicates her position 
in her 1998 book. Stressing the primacy of"]" 
(watashz), Ueno says: "'I' consists of various kinds of 
relationships such as gender, nationality, occupation, 
social status, race, culture arid ethnicity. T cannot 
escape any of these relationships, but it cannot be 
reduced to any of these either. 'I' rejects privileging 
or essentializing one single category."35 It is certainly 
true, Sub acknowledges, that being Japanese is just 
one of the multiple aspects of what makes up the self 
of a Japanese person. But he goes on to say: 
Yet, in the context where a victimizing group's 
responsibility for its victims is problematized, the 
particular aspect of "I" as a member of the group 
is being interrogated. If ''I'' was designated by 
a Vietnamese as a South Korean and responded 
with "No, I am a man," wouldn't that be an 
31 Suh, Han-nanmin, 112. Suh is critical of those who evade Japanese responsibility by referring to Ainu and Okinawan people. He understands these 
peoples as marginalized Japanese nationals, but does not discuss how their responsibility differs from responsibility held by majority Japanese. He 
holds naturalized Koreans responsible for making the Japanese government take responsibility. 
32 JWRC, ~Paneru Disukasshon,~ 90. 
33 Suh, Han-nanmin, 212. 
34 Arendt, Responsibility, 158. 
35 Ueno, Nashonarizumu, 197. 
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evasion or a rejection of the dialogue?36 
Oka Mari, a scholar in Middle East literature, 
agreed with Suh on this point and elaborated on it 
in her essay in the symposium book. In reference 
to Ueno's argument, Oka inquires into the question 
of "speaking as." If a Japanese national chooses to 
speak as a feminist or as an anti-nationalist when 
designated by the oppressed as the oppressor, that 
means that she is not simply refusing to respond to the 
oppressed but more importantly that she is exercising 
the privilege of being a Japanese, i.e., exercising the 
right to choose from various options as to whom she 
can "speak as." She is taking this privilege for granted 
while one-sidedly defining the oppressed as nothing 
but the oppressed. Oka sees colonial violence in such 
an exercise of power, noting that the same pattern 
has been repeated in other interethnic encounters.37 
Oka finds Ueno's following remark to Suh especially 
ethnocentric. Ueno tells him that he, as a resident 
Korean, should tackle the issue of "comfort women" 
as a problem of colonial domination while she, as a 
feminist, tackles the issue as a transnational problem 
of sexual violence.38 In refusing to tackle the issue of 
"comfort women" as a problem of colonial control, 
Ueno's feminism ignores the colonialist privilege 
granted to Japanese women, Oka says.39 
Further, in criticizing Ueno for admonishing 
30 Suh, Han-nanmin, 80. 
Suh to speak as a resident Korean - that is, from 
the standpoint of his ethnicity - Oka's argument 
resonates with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's 
discussion of "speaking as." Spivak notes that when 
hegemonic people want to hear "a Third World woman 
speaking as a Third World woman, they cover over the 
fact of the ignorance that they are allowed to possess 
[of the range of other positions a Third World woman 
may occupy], into a kind of homogenization."40 Ueno 
essentializes Suh as a resident Korean, covering over 
the ignorance that she is allowed to possess about 
the various positions he occupies besides merely the 
colonized. In doing so, she joins those Japanese who 
characterize resident Koreans almost always in terms 
of ethnicity.41 No wonder that they find disconcerting 
his arguments about passport, which are grounded 
in his experiences as a South Korean national, i.e., 
as a member of a state on equal terms with Japanese 
nationals irrespective of ethnicity. 
It is true that Ueno talks about the importance 
of critically examining the role of Japanese women 
in the war effort and Japanese nationalism. However, 
such an examination is important to her precisely 
because she wants to criticize nationalism in the 
victorious countries of World War II such as ·the 
United States.42 Oka finds that Ueno's criticism of the 
victors' nationalism ironically reflects nationalism 
on her own part, belying her assertion of anti-
31 Oka Marl, "Watashltachi wa naze mizukarananoru-koto ga dekiru noka,~ in JWRC, ~Ianfu" Issue, 215-236,215-219. 
38 JWRC, "Paneru Disukasshon," 62. 
39 Oka, "Watashitachi," 225. 
40 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Postcolonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. New York: Routledge, 1990, 60. 
41 Suh, Han-nanmin, 59. 
42 Ueno Chizuko, "Jendashl to rekishigaku no hOM," in JWRC, ed., Nationalism and"Ianfu" Issue. Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1998,21-31, 31. 
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nationalism. 43 Oriented toward the discourse of 
Japan as the colonized, Ueno hardly sees herself as 
pos~essing colonialist privilege as Nihonjin over other 
Asians. As regards European imperialism, Edward 
W. Said delineated in his analysis of nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century English literature "how it was 
that the imperial1 European would not or could not 
see that he or she was an imperialist and, ironically, 
how it was that the non-European in the same 
circumstances saw the European only as imperial" 
(italics in original).44 Sub sees Nihonjin as imperial, 
and is committed to continuing to criticize Nihonjin 
until they fulfill their responsibility.45 
Open-minded Subject 
The Suh-H<inazaki debate, which was touched 
off by the symposium, stirred heated arguments from 
others. It took place in 1999 in Misuzu, a humanities 
magazine. Hanazaki Kohei, an activist-intellectual 
known for his theorization of living together (kyOsel), 
published an essay (in two parts) upon receiving a 
copy of the 1998 symposium book from Suh. Suh 
wrote a response, criticizing Hanazaki's argument 
and inquiring of him about his position on the issue 
of responsibility. Hanazaki never responded to this 
inquiry in Misuzu or in any other publication, but 
he included a substantially revised version of his 
Misuzu article in his 2002 book, An Inspiration for 
Living Together. This odd termination of the debate 
bewildered those following it. Suh also published a 
~3 Oka, ~watashitachi.~ 217,232. 
book in 2002, From a Quasi-Refugee 8 Perspective, 
including his original Misuzu article. 
In his Misuzu article, Hanazaki first offers his 
personal history on the question of responsibility. Born 
before the time of Japan's defeat, he became involved 
in ethnic minority politics in the 1950s. Exposing 
his old diary and expressing sincere self-reflection, 
he talks about how at that time he lacked historical 
consciousness about Japan's aggression in Asia and 
neglected the issue of decolonization.45 He confronted 
the issue in the 1980s when he read works by Yoon, 
the aforementioned resident Korean scholar. Hanazaki 
wrote an essay in 1986 to respond to Yoon's call 
for cultivating ethnic consciousness as Japanese and 
tackling the problem of ethnic discrimination based 
on such consciousness. It should be noticed that this 
was basically the same as the view presented by Sub 
a decade later at the symposium. Learning from Yoon 
that colonial control was ethnic control, Hanazaki 
argued for forming a "responsible ethnic subject." He 
stressed the importance of recognizing the connection 
between kokumin (nation) and minzoku (ethnicity) in 
thinking about responsibility for the colonial past.47 
Instead of deepening his understanding of 
colonialism as an ethnic problem, however, Hanazaki 
moved toward a trans-border concept of "living 
together" (kyosel). He says he did so because his 1986 
essay was criticized for promoting the reconstruction 
of imperialist nationalism through linking national 
44 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books, 1993, 162. 
~5 Suh, Han-nanmin, 361. 
~6 Hanazaki Kohei, ~·oatsu-shokuminchika' to 'kyOsei' no kadai (1).~ Misuzu, 41:5 (1999): 2-25, 3-5. 
~7 lbid., 8-9. See his ~Gendai-Nihonjin nitotte minzokutekijikak.u towa,H Sekai, 483 (1986): 99-117. 
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consciousness and ethnic consciousness. Here, we 
see again an ironic use of the notion of nationalism, 
insofar as disavowal of nationalism is used to 
discourage an examination of Japanese nationals' 
responsibility for Japan's colonial past. Hanazaki 
decided to try to transcend the paradigm of the unity 
of nation and ethnicity and started to promote the 
paradigm of living together, especially as regards 
Ainu activism. After the end of the Cold War, he 
enlisted the cause of decolonization in an effort to 
form a new "trans-border democracy," with a "more 
open-minded subject" (yori hirakareta shutm) as an 
agent in this effort. 48 
What does Hanazaki mean by these trans-border 
concepts? He delineates "open-minded subject" as he 
examines the discussions in the symposium book. His 
stance is to accept the categorization as "~apanese" 
by the Other (tasha) "tentatively at first" (ittan wa) 
and then develop a relationship of living together in 
a joint effort to deal with responsibility, apology, and 
compensation.49 One should not escape categorization 
by tasha as Ueno has done, he says. However, he 
emphasizes that one should not succumb to such a 
categorization either. In order to have a productive 
dialogue with tasha, one should clearly present a 
reason for accepting the category and at the same time 
should express one's determination not to surrender 
one's "I" to the category.50 In Hanazaki's view, 
Sub's argument about tearing up one's passport is 
problematic because it asks for a passive acceptance 
48 Ibid., 9-12. 
49 Ibid., 14. 
50 Ibid., 22. 
of the categorization of the self by the Other. When 
one is faced with such a demand, Hanazaki argues, 
one cannot avoid being in a conflictual relationship 
or being restrained by the Other's gaze forever. He 
thus calls Sub's style of argument kyUdan, i.e. the 
style of accusation in which the accuser corners 
the accused and turns their relationship into non-
dialogue. Hanazaki reports observing this style 
among Ainu activists, but he goes on to say that 
in their collaboration with him, they adopted the 
communication mode of wakatte morau (to beg the 
other party to understand). He recommends it to Suh. 
In it, there is freedom on the side of the accused. It 
is a way to move toward living together, Hanazaki 
says. 51 
Sub squarely opposes Hanazaki in this regard. 
Having observed resident Koreans trying hard to 
have Japanese people understand them, often self-
deprecatingly, or passing as Japanese resigned to the 
futility of even making such an attempt, Suh declares 
that he rejects to the fullest extent of his being the 
majority's request for the act of wakatte morau on 
the part of the minority. Such a request, he claims, 
is a convenient device to shift the responsibility for 
discrimination to a lack of effort by the victimized to 
be understood. Instead of blaming the minority for 
this, Hanazaki should have problematized how it is 
the majority who show a lack of effort to understand 
their accusers, and why they are being accused, Suh 
says. 52 
51 Hanazaki KOhei, "'Datsu-shokuminchika' to 'kyOsei' no kadai (2),~ Misuzu, 41:6 (1999): 12-32, 14--16, 25. 
52 Suh, Han-nanmin, 131-132. 
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Many Japanese intellectuals have supported 
Sub's argument against Hanazaki. Ota Masakuni 
understands Sub's harshness as inevitable for the 
minority if it is to lodge effective criticism against 
the majority. 53 Here, Ota agrees with Stuart Hall. In 
discussing the situation of postcolonial diaspora, Hall 
says that in order to make a meaning, an utterance 
has to be enunciated from a certain position. 54 As 
a postcolonial Korean, Sub has to take a position 
strong enough to make his utterance heard by 
the majority. He cannot afford to take the risk of 
switching to the wakatte morau mode because his 
minority position has already and always been weak 
and will be further weakened by using such a mode. 
Saito Jun'ichi says that when a hierarchical power 
relationship pre-exists, a refusal by the party in the 
superior position of categorization by the Other 
means not only rejecting a dialogue with the Other 
but also strengthening that pre-existing relationship. 55 
Similarly, Takahashi finds Hanazaki's instruction to 
Sub on communication modes paternalistic. In order 
to change the majority and minority relationship, 
Takahashi says, majority people should try to change 
themselves first, i.e., understand why they are 
being accused and 'act to redress the grievances on 
which the accusations are based. 56 Criticizing the 
oppressor's paternalistic treatment of the oppressed, 
Paulo Freire says: "Solidarity requires that one enter 
into the situation of those with whom one is solidary; 
it is a radical posture." 57 Hanazaki's posture is not 
radical. As an advocate of living together he talks of a 
dialogue with openness and democracy, but he cannot 
endure the difficulty of sustaining a truly open and 
transformational dialogue even "tentatively."58 
Hanazaki's notion of "open-minded subject" is 
also slippery, in that it allows such a subject to enjoy 
ethnicity without acknowledging any responsibility 
for the acts of one's ethnic group. He makes a 
distinction between what one as a group member 
should do and what one can do as an individual, 
criticizing Sub for ignoring this distinction. 59 Then, he 
introduces the notion of "unique I" (koyii no watashr). 
One has the right and freedom to assert one's "unique 
I," he goes on to say, borrowing ideas from Ueno. In 
his case, his attachment to Japanese history, culture 
and natural environment and his love for the Japanese 
language, i.e., the emotions he has acquired as a 
unique person, belong to the realm of "unique I" and 
should be distinguished from the consciousness of 
membership in nation or ethnicity.60 Yet, these traits 
and emotions he sees as part of what he has acquired 
53 0ta Masakuni, ~Shohyo, Suh Kyung-Sik, Han-nanm{n no {chi kara," People~ Plan,19 (2002): 154-157. 
54 Stuart Ha11 and Sakai Naoki, ~Bunka kenkya to aidentiti," ShisO, 887 (1998): 120-140, 135. 
55 SaitO Jun'ichi, ~Seijiteki sekinin no futatsu no iso," in Abiko Kazuyoshi, Uozumi Yoichi, Nakaoka Narifumi, eds,.Sensii-sekinin to "wareware": 
"'rekishi shutat rosa" o megutte. Kyoto: Nakanishiya shuppan, 1999, 76-98, 88. 
56 Takahashi Tetsuya, "Konnichi no 'rekishi ninshiki' ronsO o meguru jokyo to ronten," in Takahashi, ed., Rekishi!Shilsei-shugi, Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 2002, 39-50, 50. 
fil Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, trans. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, 34. 
58 Hanazaki criticizes Tessa Morris-Suzuki for not taking the position of the White middle class in her argument on an Aborigina1 man, but he does 
not fully admit his privilege as a Japanese man himself. See her "Unquiet Graves.~ 
59 Hanazaki, "Datsu-shokuminchika (2),~ 14. 
60 Ibid., 28-30. 
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as a unique person do not uniquely belong to him but 
are shared with others in the Japanese ethnic group. 
His concept of the "unique I" is problematic because it 
submerges the "private" individual deeply and on-self-
consciously within the ethnic group while insulating 
him from responsibility for the group's acts. It is 
problematic also because it is oblivious to the privileged 
nature of those private enjoyments and ignores the 
fact that most resident Koreans are deprived of 
the opportunity to enjoy their ethnicity. Hanazaki 
misguidedly accuses Sub of not being satisfied with 
enjoying his ethnicity in the private realm. 
Further, in making a distinction between the 
realm of national membership and the private realm 
and then slipping ethnicity into the latter, Hanazaki 
ironically reintroduces the unity of nationality and 
ethnicity. Contrary to what he seems to assume, 
locating ethnicity in the private realm does not 
sever its linkage to nationality, precisely because 
the ethnicity he talks about (defined in terms of 
cultural practices and familial bloodlines), is the 
basis for obtaining Japanese national citizenship, as 
demonstrated in the Nationality Law and immigration 
policy. His private enjoyments within the ethnic 
group are imbued with the traits of national character. 
The commentators .on his 1986 essay were correct 
in saying that the linkage of ethnic and national 
consciousness would promote nationalism. But they 
were wrong in leaving this linkage unexamined. It 
should be examined precisely because it tends .to 
intensify a sense of Japanese nationalism. Hanazaki 
61 Takahashi, ~Rekishi ninshiki, ~50. 
62 Hanazaki, ~Datsu-shokuminchika (2),~ 14. 
63 Suh, Han-nanmin, 128. 
thinks it possible to enjoy his ethnicity privately, 
without further ramifications. But in these private 
moments he is actually enjoying his nation. 
In sum, Hanazaki argues against the thesis of 
taking responsibility as Nihonjin. Takahashi notes 
that Sub sheds a critical light on how Hanazaki 
is just like many other Japanese who evade the 
Other's accusations and protect Japanese privilege 
by denouncing that thesis. 61 Hanazaki is also in tune 
with those liberal Japanese who have embraced the 
universal values of peace and democracy and have 
recently begun to espouse the idea of "multicultural 
living together" (tabunka kyOsei) from the perspective 
of human rights without attention to the colonial past. 
Both sides of Hanazaki's argument are problematic 
not least because they are widely shared among self-
claimed progressives. 
Self-Transformation 
In countering Sub's argument about Japanese 
privilege, Hanazaki claims that Japan's economic 
success, which is an important source for this 
privilege, was brought about not solely by Japan's 
initiative but partly by the US-led Occupation policy 
and by Cold War pressures. In a sense, Japan was 
forced to select the path of economic recovery, he 
says. 62 His sudden introduction of this topic puzzled 
Sub and led him to suspect that Hanazaki was 
trying to protect something. 53 When looking at their 
exchange as a whole, what is also odd is the way in 
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which Hanazaki terminated their exchange. What is 
hidden behind these odd actions? 
In analyzing the Suh-Hanazaki debate after the 
publication of their 2002 books, Nakano Toshio, 
a scholar in intellectual history, finds a profound 
historical meaning in Hanazaki's odd (kimyii) 
termination of th'e exchange. In Nakano's view, 
Hanazaki was trying to protect a certain kind of 
national subject, whose formation could be traced 
back to wartime Japanese thought production. 
Nakano praises Hanazaki's intention to initiate a 
long-overdue inqu~ry into decolonization. Yet in 
responding to Suh~. Hanazaki immediately stumbled 
over a communication problem. Nakano takes this 
as an unavoidabl'el consequence precisely because 
colonialism is, in;1his view, a mode of control that 
generates and fiXes a relationship between the 
colonizers and the colonized through systematic 
discrimination. An equal communication between 
them is structurall& precluded. In his communication 
with Suh, Hanazaki, acting as a majority person, 
asserted the righLto self-definition. Historically, 
the self-defining~subject Uiko kettei-suru shutai) 
discursively emerged as the agent of imperialism and 
colonialism who·internalized the state's goal as its 
own personal goal):and voluntarily committed hideous 
colonial violence, Nakano says.64 
Pointing out1that Hanazaki evaded Sub's 
criticism by a rhetoric of self-reflection (hansei) in 
his revised Misuzu essay, Nakano argues that the self-
defining subject does not ignore the Other completely. 
It includes a self-reflective component, which extends 
a sense of responsibility to a sincere concern for a 
minority person's appeal and "offers understanding" 
(wakatte ageru) to that person. Yet, it is willing to 
communicate with the minority only so long as the 
minority does not present any contradiction to its self, 
which it claims the sole right to define. Nakano traces 
the idea of the self-reflecting subject to the post-
war discourse of national subject formation by the 
influential intellectuals Otsuka Hisao and Maruyama 
Masao, in which the function of self-reflection is to 
forget the colonial past and create a domestically-
oriented national subject. Such a self-reflecting 
subject refuses to confront the colonized Other on 
any but the subject's own terms, Nakano says. He 
regrets that Hanazaki ignored this intellectual history 
and refused to talk to Suh, the colonized.65 In Naoki 
Sakai's words, Hanazaki recoiled into the "familiar 
and intimate sphere" of the national subject and 
confirmed "its putative unity."66 
Nonetheless, Nakano sees the possibility of 
dismantling the idea of the self-defining subject in the 
Suh-Hanazaki debate. In encountering a minority, a 
self-defining subject cannot avoid feeling a threat to 
the unity of the self. But such a feeling of threat can 
be a beginning of self-transformation, a beginning 
of dialogue with the minority, Nakano says. 67 In 
his view, which he has expressed elsewhere, self-
54 Nakano Toshio, ~Jiko-hanseiteki shutai no airo,w Gendai shisO, 30:7 (2002): 17-24, 18-19, 22. 
55 Ibid., 22-23. 
66 Naoki Sakai, "The West·- A Dialogic Prescription or Proscription?w Social Identities.11:3 (2005): 177-195,178. 
67 Nakano, "Jiko-hanseiteki shutai,w 24. 
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transformation is inevitable if one wants to fulfill 
one's responsibility to the Other. Contrary to the 
assertion by Kato and others that it is necessary to 
establish a unitary national subject before taking 
responsibility, Nakano says, the unified subject, 
or rather the imagination of it, should fall apart 
at the moment it takes responsibility. For when 
responsibility is understood as a response to the Other, 
the act of taking responsibility as Japanese inevitably 
involves listening to the Other's voice and accepting 
the conflicts, tensions, and uneasiness it causes 
inside the "I." These conflicts and tensions lead to a 
critical examination of "I" as Japanese, going beyond 
the concern for the Other's appeal acknowledged 
by Hanazaki. When responding to the Other, the 
imagined unity of the subject is inevitably fragmented 
under the Other's gaze. This fragmentation (bunretsu) 
may in turn generate political action to fulfill 
responsibility, Nakano argues. 68 
Hanazaki's self-reflective national subject, 
disguised as a postmodern "I" with multiple 
identifications, refuses to go through bunretsu. 
Nakano sees a similar refusal in Ueno's "I." Like 
Ueno, Nakano talks of ''I'' as having multiple 
positions. But he does not characterize "I" as an 
ultimately unified subject, but as an agent that has the 
potential to change in response to the Other's voice. 
In his view, the problem with Ueno's argument is an 
a priori assumption of what "''' is, however multiple. 
One needs to accept not just the multiplicity but the 
vulnerability of one's ''I'' to fragmentation, change, 
and reconstitution when trying to take responsibility 
in an encounter with the Other and facing the 
inevitable conflict such an encounter entails. Ueno 
refuses to experience such conflict, Nakano says. 69 
In this way, Nakano finds the same problem 
in holding onto the old identity position of national 
subject, in the case of Hanazaki, as in asserting the 
new postmodern identity position of "I," in that of 
Ueno. The problem is a desire to protect one's right to 
define oneself and ultimately one's right to maintain 
a unitary self. A corollary to this is the problem of 
refusing to examine and transfonn oneself in response 
to the Other. Probably, such a unified subject cannot 
listen to the Other, not because its consciousness is 
"hollowed out," as Sub says, but because its mind is 
filled with an ironically un-self-reflective imperialist 
desire. In its empire of self, it can only have a self-
serving monologue. 
Like Nakano, Sub talks about deconstructing 
the notion of Nihonjin in the process of fulfilling 
responsibility. Indeed, Nakano's thesis of fragmenting 
a unified subjectivity echoes Sub's metaphor of 
tearing up a passport. For Nakano, the act of 
fulfilling responsibility takes place when the unity 
of a Japanese subject or "I" falls apart in a dialogue 
with the Other. For Sub, a Japanese national could 
release herself from responsibility only by giving up 
all the privileges associated with her passport. When 
tearing it up, she would understand its significance 
and would paradoxically become capable of listening 
138 Nakano Toshio, Otsuka Hisao toMaroyama Masao: Do in, shutai, sensO-sekinin. Tokyo: Seidosba, 2001, 298-299. 
69 Ibid., 330-331. 
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and responding to the Other, i.e., beginning to fulfill 
responsibility toward the Other. 70 
Democratic Citizen 
In Sub's view, Takahashi is the Japanese scholar 
who most clearly adopts the stance of deconstructing 
(kaitai-suru) "Japanese."71 Sub and Takahashi are 
primarily concerned about the political effects 
of such deconstruction. In a .series of their public 
conversations in 1998 and 1999, they both said that 
taking responsibility as Japanese ultimately meant 
transforming (henkaku-suru) Japanese society into a 
"different Japan" (betsu no Nihon).72 Using the same 
language, however, they envisage different kinds of 
betsu no Nihon. Their difference seems to stem from 
their different views on ethnicity as partly discussed 
above. 
With the expression of betsu no Nihon, Takahashi 
talks of changing Japan into a democratic society 
"in a radical sense," envisioning a new social system 
that promotes mutual respect for Otherness among 
different kinds of people and stressing the need to 
deconstruct Nihonjin in a political and civic sense as a 
prerequisite to creating such a system.73 His political 
goal as a public intellectual seeking "philosophy as 
political resistance" is to transform Japanese people 
into citizens capable of changing Japan into a radically 
democratic society that will take responsibility for the 
past. In his pursuit of a civic nation, however, ethnic 
diversity is appreciated as a universal value, but an 
inquiry into the privilege of Japanese ethnicity, which 
is critically important to Sub's vision of creating a 
different Japan, has little place. 
Takahashi is in fact inclined to argue in 
universalist tenns. He sees a universal dimension in 
the act of taking responsibility. From this perspective, 
the issue is violence and injustice caused by human 
beings against other human beings. When assuming 
responsibility for Japan's colonial past, he argues, 
Japanese are inevitably exposed to the universal 
dimension of taking responsibility and may become 
critical of colonialism in principle. 74 Conversely, 
when interrogated by Asian Others, Japanese people 
not only have universal responsibility but also have 
responsibility that should be taken as Japanese. 
Originating in Japanese colonial control, it is political 
responsibility for crimes committed in the name of 
the state. Japanese nationals have responsibility to 
make their government provide compensation and 
apologize to non-Japanese victims.75 Takahashi thus 
distinguishes two types of responsibility, universal 
and particular. Particular political responsibility is 
civic in nature. 
Takahashi's primary concern with activism 
70 Nakano understands responsibility for the colonial past by way of Morris-Suzuki's idea that people are "implicated" in the past wrongdoings. See 
her "Hihanteki sCizCiryoku n,o kiki," Sekai, 683 (2001): 80-92. Nakano's view goes beyond civic responsibility and is similar to Sub's. 
71 Suh,Han-nanmin,ll4. 
72 Suh Kyung-Sik and Takahashi Tetsuya, Danzetsu noseiki shOgen nojidai, Tokyo: lwanami shoten, 2000, 143. 
7.3 Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo sekinin-ron, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999, 51. 
74 Takahashi, Sengo sekinin-ron,l70. 
75 Ibid., 38-46. 
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and universal and civic values seems to limit his 
encounter with the Other. Nakamasa Masaki suggests 
that to achieve the political goal of legislating for 
war compensation, Takahashi, a prominent scholar 
of Derrida who should be thoroughly aware of 
the complexity of the notion of the Other, may be 
choosing to discuss this notion in rather simplified 
terms.76 Takahashi states that to take responsibility 
as Japanese is to transform the Japanese political 
community by absorbing memories of the Other into 
the core of the self and turning them into resources 
for continuous self-criticism, thereby rebuilding a 
new relationship with the Other.77 Yet, it is not clear 
whether this Japanese self hears the voice of the 
Other in its complexity, including the ethnic part. As 
Maekawa Ichiro notes, in focusing on the legal and 
political aspects of taking responsibility, Takahashi 
seems to preclude an inquiry into the reasons and 
meaning of the Other's historical experiences and 
dismiss a possibility of responding to the Other 
over those reasons and meaning.78 Sub seems to be 
pursuing such a possibility. 
Suh also expresses interest in the universal 
value of peace and hopes to create a new universal 
framework for interethnic collaboration. 79 Yet, he is 
concerned about the frequent use by Japanese of the 
rhetoric that responsibility belongs to human beings 
in general.80 He is afraid that many of those concerned 
76 Nakamasa, Posuto-modan, 212-214. 
11 Takahashi, Sengo sekinin-ron, 58. 
about the issue of "comfort women," like Ueno, can 
see it only as a. universal issue of sexual violence, 
not as an issue for which they are held responsible 
as Nihonjin. 81 Indeed, Takahashi's thesis of universal 
responsibility may end up reinforcing the universalist 
orientation among liberals. They may dismiss his 
caB for taking responsibility as Japanese nationals, 
let alone Sub's call for doing so as ethnic Japanese. 
Given the role of universal values in orienting 
progressives toward obscuring Japanese responsibility, 
as demonstrated in Ueno's and Hanazaki's case, 
Takahashi seems to run the risk of falling prey to 
this established pattern. As Catherine Lu argues, 
a universalist approach to colonial responsibility 
is likely to obscure "structural injustice," both in 
colonized and colonialist societies, and to allow 
unjust social structures to persist. 52 Takahashi needs to 
pay closer attention to Sub's critique of national and 
ethnic privilege in order to grasp the complexity of 
colonial responsibility beyond its civic and universal 
aspects. Sub's critique of privilege is a powerful tool 
for analyzing how unjust social structures of colonial 
domination have persisted in postcolonial Japan. 
Conclusion: Taking Colonial 
Responsibility in Multiethnic Japan 
In arguing for the fulfillment of Japanese 
responsibility for the colonial past, Sub discussed 
78 Maekawa lchirO, ~Rekshigaku toshite-no 'shokuminchi-sekinin,'" Jinbun ronsyfi (Soka University), 20 (2008): 5-24, 17. 
19 Suh, Han-nanmin, 362; Suh and Takahashi, Danzefsu,150-152. 
80 Ibid.,l07-110. Suh notes that some victims of the Holocaust, including Primo Levi, see it as a human crime and feel responsibility for it. 
81 JWRC, ~Paneru Disukasshon," 65. 




colonizers' privilege as well as colonized people's 
predicament and problematized the notion of Nihonjin. 
Discussing Englishness, Simon Gikandi argues that 
"colonized peoples and imperial spaces were crucial 
ingredients in the generation and consolidation of a 
European identity and its master narratives. "83 Before 
the symposium, what was largely missing in studies 
of Japanese national subjectivity was such a relational 
perspective, an Asian perspective in the context of 
the Japanese empire. In the debates on responsibility 
generated at and by the 1997 symposium, it became 
clear that the persisting Occupation-era discourses 
and the notion of transcending nationalism were 
discouraging studies of colonizers' identification in 
relation to Asian Others. In their elaborations of Sub's 
arguments, however, Oka and Nakano d~lved into the 
question of Japanese subject formation, pointing to its 
imperialist nature.·:. 
Pointing out the relational nature of identity 
formation, Koschmann suggests that under the 
effect of Kato's ~'Since Defeat," which discussed 
national subject foimation based on the unification of 
conservatives and ,progressives, "domestic political 
opposition would have been projected onto a foreign 
Other, creating a new binary between insiders and 
outsiders. "84 I think that the domestic unity against 
Asian Others has lo'ng been in place, not in the form of 
the unanimity that Kate seeks, but in a compleme.ntary 
form. As conservatives have extolled the supremacy 
of the Japanese as an ethnic group, progressives 
have asserted a democratic peace-seeking national 
subjectivity. The assertions of the two groups are not 
in conflict but are supportive of each other. Together, 
they have strengthened the identity position of 
Nihonjin as ethnic and civic against Asian foreigners. 
Herein lies the need to look into both ethnic and civic 
aspects of Japanese identification in relation to Asian 
Others. Such a research need has long been- pointed 
out by resident Korean intellectuals, including Sub, 
Yoon and Lee, but has not received due attention from 
Japanese scholars. 
If it is true, as Koschmann suggests, that the role 
of Asian Others has become important in Japanese 
self-perception, then, the question of responsibility 
for Japan's aggression and colonial domination 
in Asia, both in thought production and activism, 
should remain critically important. The majority of 
foreign residents in Japan are Asians whose personal 
and familial trajectories are mostly traced back to 
the history of the Japanese empire. In continuing 
to tackle the question of colonial responsibility, 
scholars and activists need to look into the national 
and ethnic privilege of Nihonjin, the privilege that 
was first formed through Japan's colonial domination 
in Asia. Above all, they should pay attention to both 
the universal and particular kinds of responsibility, 
not to the call for "multicultural living together" that 
ignores the history of the Japanese empire and lets the 
question of responsibility dissipate into the embrace 
of the universal values of cultural diversity and human 
rights. 
83 Gikandi, Simon, Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 5. 
84 Koschmann, ~National Subjectivity, w 133. 
